
INVITATION TO THE NEGOTIATION TABLE



In accordance with the Treaty, its states parties cooperate on the basis of principles of indivisible and equal security, non-infliction of damage to the security of each other. Any measures in the sphere of security undertaken by each state party... shall be carried out in conformity with the security interests of all other states parties...", claims the draft of the European Security Treaty published by Russia in late November 2009.

I don't know how much time will pass before this phrase becomes a legally binding norm. I am not sure that the new treaty will be concluded in the near future. But I certainly believe that it high time we started the reform of the European security architecture. Many in Russia have this feeling and the country has initiated the elaboration of the EST, the opening article of which I have just cited. However, this feeling is also typical of other European capitals - above all, in Paris, Madrid, Berlin, and Bern.

Many actors of "the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian zone from Vancouver to Vladivostok" (this is how Article 10 of the draft treaty indicates its broad geographical scope) are still hesitating. They see familiar and correct wording in the Russian proposal, but they also seek for some hidden agenda. This confusion proves that the treaty is indeed needed. It should be simple, may be even banal sometimes. But it should be lack any ambiguity. The treaty is on demand because the parties should stop cultivating suspicion and mistrust. Europe has entered a new age. European security mechanisms should be adequate to the requirements of this new age, should be based on trust in Europe and Eurasia. The OSCE is a product of transition (even though the Russian draft does not campaign for its dismantlement, hence, demonstrating too much irrelevant tact). The Cold War is over. The Berlin Wall is back in history. And we must no longer focus on post-bipolar, post-Communist and other post-something relations. It's time we worked at new relationship — equal, based on mutual respect and pan-European solidarity.

Russia should struggle for global political warming in Europe. However, Moscow cannot cope with this problem alone and, like in case of real climate change, it needs allies.

The draft of the treaty comprises 14 short articles. The invitation is on the table. From the "like-dislike" of the current kitchen table discussions we should pass to the constructive debate at the negotiation table. Hey, Europe, the dinner is served!

This is a topic for Kseniya Smertina from St. Petersburg, "The initiative gives a positive feeling this is the first Russian proposal of such scale in a long while... The Treaty should not be taken as ends, but rather as means, which will help to involve Russia in the dialogue with the existing European and Euro-Atlantic structures.'

I have no doubt that nothing prevents us to go in parallel courses — along with consultations and then negotiations on the EST, the parties could start the dialogue on the legally binding regulations for the conventional arms and forces in Europe. Shall the CFE Treaty be revived, if all Russian appeals for universal ratification of the adapted document are neglected? The CFE Treaty somehow becomes a ghost of the transition period, a ghost of the past. But we are in the new

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century, we have new landmarks and priorities, so we should all launch a new study – a comprehensive, up-to-date treaty on conventional forces in Europe.

However, even after setting forth the EST initiative, Russia cannot relax. And I don't mean the need for long and serious dialogue with any potential member of the treaty — from listening Spain to interested but skeptical Germany, to even more skeptical Poland and yawning Obama's administration. I am speaking about Russia's allies now. And we all know that their list is quite short, it is mainly limited to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

One may keep saying the CSTO mantra and write it down in the draft of the treaty, but it will hardly change the situation. I remember an important debate on the future of the EST in one of the European capitals. The Russians insisted on the participation of a CSTO representative. The European participants were attentively following the Russian arguments, when suddenly the CSTO member raised his voice and ruined all Russian diplomacy with his incompetence.

Hence, it would make sense to establish order and discipline in Russia's backyard (the CSTO occupies this niche, albeit the phrase must be a stumbling block for you, since the reality does not correspond with the declarations). Then Moscow should establish dialogue with its neighbors — those components of the allegedly existing CIS, which are not members of the CSTO. And then they should develop joint initiatives and construct a new building of the European security together and not on their own.

Russia is losing in this sphere. It loses one point after another. However, is it all so bad in Eurasia for us to be in depression (or to justify the unwillingness to do anything)? Read the polemics between Murat Laumulin and Farkhod Tolipov, leading Kazakhstani and Uzbek experts. I looked through it several times — and not only because I am an editor and it's my duty, but also as a curious reader. The experts argue about integration in Central Asia, but at the background of their discussion one can see three major external actors (Russia, the EU, and China). And when they say "Europe", they actually mean "Russia" in most cases. No, they are experienced researchers and do not confuse political terms with geographical ones. They sincerely believe that the Central Asian states can still overcome regional disputes and integrate with Europe (not limiting themselves to the OSCE chairmanship) together with Russia and not by circumventing Russia. Murat Laumulin claims that despite fairness and political rationale of many Russia's proposals on European security, Kazakhstan should also pay its tribute to "the maintenance of integrity of the Eurasian (post-Soviet) space."

Working with the CSTO and EurAzES, Russia should not forget about simple things, which may attract or push away its natural strategic allies (even though they may not admit such status). What is important for the ordinary Russians in relations with Europe (i.e. the EU)? Obviously, the elimination of the Schengen visas and free movement of people. Then the idea of united Europe will be clear. Ask people in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, or Armenia. Instead of Schengen visas they have to overcome the piles of bureaucratic obstacles (especially, if they want to work in Russia) and sometimes they are much more humiliating than visa applications. I know what I am saying — we have recently been collecting the documents to employ an intern from Uzbekistan in the PIR Center. And we decided to act in compliance with the law (it did not seem very strict) and without bribes. Of course, we have eventually got the labor permit. But the process was... shameful.

And there can be no justifications such as "we defend the rights of the Russian labor." Does Russia need new joint European security mechanisms? Does Russia need allies in Eurasia? If yes, Moscow should try to create a model of *attractive Russia* — attractive to neighbors and friends. Russia should not be friendly with an amorphous "post-Soviet space", it should be nice with people who live in our neighborhood.

New prospects for Moscow emerge in Northeast Asia (of which we are part). It is important not to lose the momentum and to move from slogans to practical implementation. Our author from Vladivostok Maria Teploukhova has submitted an analytical article, even though she could well

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
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write a report on the preparations for the APEC summit there. She investigates the public sentiments in the Russian Far East, studies geopolitical partnerships and regional rivalries. But her key question is what Russia wants and can gain from holding the APEC summit? The event is still two years ahead, but we should formulate now our objectives in the Far East, in Northeast Asia and in the Asia Pacific, insists Ms. Teploukhova. And I believe, she is right.

The discussions on nuclear disarmament are not new to our readers. However, as I am writing this article, the new START Treaty is yet to be signed (perhaps, it is ready by spring), while the 2010 NPT Review Conference is approaching. Nuclear disarmament should not be the oligopoly of the two powers. Thus, what can be done by all nuclear-weapon states to demonstrate their commitment to the cause of nuclear disarmament?

I suggest three simple steps, which can take a form of the statement by P-5 (in development of Resolution 1886 and on the eve of the NPT Review Conference) and then supported as a unilateral initiative by India.

- ☐ Nuclear-weapon states agree not to build up their own nuclear arsenals any longer.
- ☐ Nuclear-weapon states pledge to refrain from deploying their nuclear arms on the ground beyond their national territories.
- ☐ Nuclear-weapon states refuse to develop new, more advanced types of nuclear weapons.



Vladimir Orlov