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Dismantling the Cold War

**U.S. and NIS Perspectives
on the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program**

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Foreword by
Senator Sam Nunn

Chapter 5

Perspectives of Russian Decision-makers and Problems of Implementation

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The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, better known in Russia as the Nunn-Lugar Program, is designed to provide the Russian Federation and other newly independent states of the former Soviet Union (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan) with technical assistance to eliminate strategic offensive arms, reduce the risks of weapons proliferation, retrain and employ former weapons scientists and engineers, improve nuclear emergency response capabilities, destroy chemical weapons stockpiles, enhance capabilities for fissile material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A), stimulate conversion of defense industrial enterprises for commercial purposes, and develop systems of export controls within and among the republics. In dollar terms, the Russian component of the CTR Program is the largest; politically, it is also considered the most important. Out of a total of \$1.24 billion in assistance proposed under the CTR Program as of the beginning of 1996, the Russian share has been \$612 million.¹

However, several obstacles to effective implementation of the CTR Program in Russia have been encountered. By late 1995, actual disbursements to Russia amounted to about \$212 million, or 34 percent of total CTR spending for Russia notified to the U.S. Congress by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Unofficial estimates of the amounts actually received under the CTR program in terms of real goods and services arriving in Russia are even lower. One such estimate in mid-1995 calculated that Russia had received only 22 percent of promised CTR obligations from the United States.² There are at least four dimensions to the problem of CTR implementation in Russia: inter-

1. U.S. Department of Defense, CTR Program Office, *CTR Funding by Country*, December 18, 1995, pp. 1-2. EDITORS' NOTE: For CTR funding by country see Appendix to this volume.

2. Unofficial estimate by the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation.

national politics, domestic politics, financial constraints, and technical issues. This chapter focuses primarily on the domestic political issues and events, both in Russia and the United States, that have slowed CTR implementation.

Domestic Political Moods and the CTR Program

U.S.-Russian agreements were concluded at an unfortunate time from the standpoint of Russian domestic politics. Proposals for cooperation were almost immediately criticized by Russian parliamentarians. The CTR umbrella agreements first came under attack in December 1992 in hearings held by the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation during its plenary session. Sergei Baburin, Gennadii Sayenko, Mikhail Astafiev, and other influential deputies criticized the bilateral agreements because they "contradicted the Russian Constitution" and "violated Russian sovereignty." Moreover, in a report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Russian Parliament, Committee Chairman Yevgenii Ambartsumov suggested that the agreements violated some of Russia's legal norms and that "the U.S. side [could] use the agreements to export illegally important materials from Russia, avoiding Russian customs control." At the time, however, Ambartsumov pledged not to overturn or obstruct the agreements, acknowledging that the negative consequences of doing so outweighed the ill effects he foresaw in cooperating with the United States. Instead, he promised to address outstanding problems through an exchange of official letters between U.S. and Russian foreign offices.³

During these same hearings, a crucial voice of support was the head of Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), Viktor Mikhailov, who responded to the sharp criticism of the deputies, insisting, "U.S.-Russian cooperation in the nuclear field is extremely important for us, and we should protect it, not attack it." In response to questions of possible ulterior motives on the part of the United States in providing assistance, Mikhailov argued, "they [the United States] are afraid that there can be an accident during the transportation or storage of nuclear

3. The December 1992 committee deliberations and report and the statements by Chairman Ambartsumov are all reported in *Sovietskaia Rossiia viet* (Russia), December 19, 1992, p. 14.

weapons in Russia. They also are afraid that Russia won't be able to follow the START I Treaty because of a lack of financial resources."⁴

As a result of testimony by Mikhailov and others, a majority of the deputies came to the conclusion that the CTR agreements did not compromise Russian national security and that the United States was motivated not by espionage but by, in the words of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ambartsumov, "reasonable self-interest." At the same time, some observed, as Astafiev did, that "Germany in 1945 was also disarmed free of charge."⁵ Since this early, heated debate, the CTR issue has not been debated publicly in Russia. Neither legislators from the State Duma nor the mass media have paid much attention to the issue of cooperative demilitarization. At the same time, the positions of both proponents and opponents of the agreement have not changed radically.

The high-level support that the CTR Program received during this period was the result of the bottom-line understanding among Russian policymakers that U.S. funding and technical assistance were crucial to Russian military efforts to destroy strategic weapons in accordance with START time lines, reduce the risk of accidents during nuclear warhead dismantlement, and minimize proliferation risks by assisting development of a modern system of MPC&A. As Colonel-General Evgenii Maslin, head of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD), has observed, "We would like to carry out the process of nuclear warhead dismantlement by ourselves, but we should be realists—there is a lack of financial resources in Russia."⁶

Russian officials continue to acknowledge the importance of U.S. assistance for demilitarization and other goals. However, the strong support of General Maslin and other realists in Russia's top decision-making circles on the overall goals of the CTR Program has been muted by the increasingly vocal differences between the United States and Russia on CTR implementation as well as a variety of unrelated political and military issues.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Evgenii Maslin, "Poka chto ni odin yadernyi boepropas v Rossii ne propodal i ne byl pokhishen" (Thus far, not a single nuclear device has disappeared or been stolen in Russia), *Yadernyi Kontrol* (Nuclear control), No. 5 (1995), p. 12.

Implementation of demilitarization projects pursuant to Nunn-Lugar legislation has been hampered by shifts in the political climate in both the United States and Russia. Illustrative of this change was the vote, on June 14, 1995, by the U.S. House of Representatives (224-180) in favor of an amendment to the CTR legislation that would freeze any further assistance to Russia pending its cessation of biological weapons research.⁷ Although the amendment was subsequently modified to allow some CTR funding for Russia, this provision has nonetheless had a very negative impact on the U.S.-Russian dialogue on nuclear security and nonproliferation issues. Similarly, the attempt by the Republican majority in Congress to adopt a law freezing CTR assistance to Russia if it continues its nuclear commerce with Iran (including construction of nuclear reactors at Bushehr)⁸ has been met in Russia with significant disappointment and even irritation. Russian officials, in private conversations, maintain that some influential forces in the United States must be trying to provoke Russia to reject CTR assistance. Although this is not yet an official position, the reality is that more and more Russian officials share this view.

Since 1995, there have been increasing signs in Russia of anti-Americanism among not only legislators, but also governmental officials, analysts, and diplomats. This anti-American mood is not as aggressive as it was during the Cold War. Nonetheless, it demonstrates that "the honeymoon is over" and that the euphoria over the end of the Cold War has officially passed. It now appears that U.S.-Russian relations may be entering a time of "cold peace." This new dimension to Russian foreign policy has made Russian officials much more critical of U.S. initiatives, and it has had a special impact on the CTR Program.

In economic affairs, for example, Russia's policy has been evolving toward more active support for Russian industry and national enterprises. In this context, the focus of criticism of the CTR Program is that it is primarily a means for the U.S. government to support U.S. business, not Russia. Some Russian political leaders and managers of industrial enterprises have become vocal critics of the CTR Program for its resistance to using readily available equipment, manpower, and

materials from local enterprises in Russia to perform even basic demilitarization activities. Imports of heavy-lift cranes, cutting tools, and other low-technology equipment at higher cost and with frequent delays compared to indigenous supplies, these observers claim, have wasted CTR funds and made poor use of Russia's own demilitarization resources. This criticism is likely to become even sharper in the future as Russian economic conditions worsen. Even now, Russian entrepreneurs from military-industrial enterprises assert, for example, that "if the Nunn-Lugar money had been given directly to them they would have created equipment tens times cheaper than Americans do, in a shorter amount of time, without bureaucratic waste, with the same or higher quality, and with tens of thousands of highly qualified Russian workers and engineers saved from unemployment."⁹

Growing anti-Americanism may also play a part in Russia's current arms control policies. The Russian leadership appears to be in no hurry to ratify START II¹⁰ even though it has talked about the possibility of concluding a START III Treaty in the near future.¹¹ For example, Sergei Karaganov, one of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's key foreign policy consultants, has argued that "Russia, according to its current geopolitical situation, should not agree to any further cuts of nuclear weapons."¹² Ratification of the START II agreement has been a glacial process. According to Russian law, the president is responsible for initiating the ratification process, yet it was only on June 21, 1995, that President Yeltsin, after a series of inexplicable delays, finally offered START II to the State Duma for ratification.

Conversations on arms control issues with key Duma legislators, including many who sit on the Committee on Defense and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, reveal a generally favorable view of

7. Associated Press, June 14, 1995.

8. Associated Press, May 24, 1995.

9. Author's interview with Yuri Skokov, November, 1994.

10. Author's interview with an official in the president's office, June 1995. See also Yuri Fedorov, "Chto stoit za torgom vokrug SNV-2?" (What is behind the haggling over START II?) *Moskovskie novosti* (Moscow news), No. 42 (June 1995), p. 14.

11. Television interview with Andrei Kozyrev, ORF Channel, April 21, 1995.

12. Sergei Karaganov, quoted in *Nezavisimaaia Gazeta* (Independent newspaper), June 12, 1994.

START II ratification.¹³ However, considerable obstacles to ratification remain, even if these committees give their approval. In the words of one observer:

It is not the right time for ratification. The president does not want to confront the legislators on this particular point, and at the same time, he does not want to start public, and long-lasting, hearings. For him, the better way would be to slow down the ratification process while still following internationally and bilaterally recognized Russian obligations. It is the same as it was for a long time with the budget: the government has it, but the Duma has not approved it, so the government uses the acting budget for implementation.¹⁴

Recent U.S. moves to expand NATO membership to former Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) states have also had a chilling effect on U.S.-Russian arms control efforts and cooperation at large. In the words of Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs, "There are considerable questions as to how we would ratify START II when the political situation in Europe has changed and when the biggest military machine in the world [NATO] has made attempts, successful enough, to reach the Russian border. We would not be able to explain this paradox to the Russian people."¹⁵

This kind of rhetoric notwithstanding, there is still a clear understanding, at least among governmental experts, that continued support from the United States is required for Russia's efforts to dismantle nuclear weapons and improve fissile material protection and controls.

13. Author's interviews with Sergei Yushenkov, chairman of the Committee on Defense; Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and Vyacheslav Nikonov, chairman of the Subcommittee on Arms Control. All three represent the "liberal" wing of the parliament.

14. Author's interview with representative of the presidential administration, July 1995.

15. Lukin is quoted in *The Economist*, April 8, 1995. Even if the Duma votes for ratification, the ratification process cannot be completed without the approval of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of parliament. In a vein similar to those of his Duma colleagues, Vladimir Shumeiko, the speaker of the Federation Council, has publicly insisted on establishing, by law, linkage between START II ratification and NATO expansion: "Only if there is no expansion of NATO," he has said, "would the ratification of the START II Treaty be possible." See *Kommersant Daily*, April 2, 1995, p. 1.

Any anti-Americanism among Russian officials and parliamentarians is balanced by the realization that there is no real alternative to assistance from and cooperation with the United States, at both the lab-to-lab and government-to-government levels. A more general problem, particularly at the parliamentary level, is the apparently decreasing interest in arms control problems, the bilateral relationship with the United States, and other international issues. In the months before and after the Russian parliamentary elections in December 1995, both houses of the Russian Parliament spent most of their time focused on domestic issues.

Views of Russian Organizations Involved in the CTR Program

The key "centers of power" in Russia for decision-making on CTR implementation are Minatom, the President's Office, and the National Security Council. The two agencies most involved in the day-to-day operation of the CTR Program are Minatom and the Ministry of Defense, both of which have signed umbrella agreements with the U.S. Department of Defense. Each of these bureaucracies has its own particular strengths and weaknesses. Minatom's greatest weakness bureaucratically is its poor relationship with powerful oil and gas interests in the government, headed by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Oil and Gas Minister Igor Shafranik. The President's Office is hampered by a lack of experience in the practical implementation of negotiated agreements, including the CTR Program. The National Security Council is encumbered by internal dissension and its constant organizational restructurings.

These offices also differ in terms of their concerns about and support for CTR implementation. Moreover, many other offices and individuals within Russia's vast bureaucracy are involved in CTR Program implementation and hold sometimes strong opinions on its success or failure thus far. Table 5-1 summarizes, in general terms, attitudes toward the program within Russian ministries and other key bodies involved in CTR decision-making and implementation, both in the government and the parliament.

It is significant that in contrast to Minatom's apparent support for the program when it was initiated, some of the strongest skepticism toward CTR now is found at this agency. On the one hand, Minatom Minister Mikhailov has recognized that his ministry has an urgent need to improve MPC&A systems, railcar security, nuclear emergency

Table 5-1. Key Russian Organizations and Individuals and Their Views on CTR.

Organization and key individuals	Attitude and comments
Minatom Viktor Mikhailov, Evgenii Mikerin, Mikhail Ryzhov	Mainly negative Mikhailov: "If I had been asked, not as Minister but as a scientist, whether it was worth signing the agreements with the Americans, my response would have been 'no'." ^a
Ministry of Defense Gen. Evgenii Maslin	Very positive Maslin: "The U.S. offered us aid, free of charge. We have no money in our budget to solve the disarmament problems ourselves. Why should we say 'no'? The CTR helps us at the MOD a lot." ^b
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sergei Kislyak	Mixed Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Mamedov: "Agreements concluded with the United States on the Nunn-Lugar fund fully reflect Russia's national interests and meet Russia's concerns.... At the same time, we would expect U.S. assistance to be given more actively to Russian enterprises and not converted into a subsidy to U.S. companies. We cannot be satisfied by the fact that 50 to 90 percent of assistance is spent for U.S. companies, not for Russia. We cannot be satisfied either by the proportion between promised and disbursed funding." ^c
Committee on Convention-Related Issues of CW and BW Pavel Siutkin, chairman	Generally positive Siutkin: "There is no doubt we need this assistance, especially in areas related to chemical weapons destruction.... However, as yet we've gotten no more than \$20 million from the promised \$55 million." ^d
^a Interview with Viktor Mikhailov, <i>Yadernyi Kontrol</i> , No. 2 (1995), pp. 9-11. ^b Author's interview with General Maslin, July 1995. ^c Author's interview with Sergei Kislyak, July 1995. ^d Author's interview with Pavel Siutkin.	

response capabilities, and fissile material controls, and that he lacks domestic sources of funding for these projects. On the other hand, he has also argued that:

we would be able to improve MPC&A ourselves.... I am personally satisfied by the implementation of only two agreements: on containers and on the storage facility design. Frankly speaking, it is the U.S. side that is

Organization and key individuals	Attitude and comments
President's Office Yuri Baturin, president's aide for national security	Generally positive Baturin: "We generally support the idea of the Nunn-Lugar fund, and we expect it to increase, not to diminish in the coming months. The problem of reducing nuclear and proliferation risks is a very complicated and delicate one. We would appreciate any assistance in this context but we would deny any pressure, any linkages and conditions, any dishonest games around this aid." ^a
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission Viktor Chernomyrdin, Oleg Soskovets	Generally positive Key commission members appear to be supportive of the parts of the CTR Program relating to conversion, export controls, and MPC&A, but are critical of the lack of involvement by Russian enterprises.
National Security Council Valerii Manilov	Positive Valerii Manilov, deputy secretary of the National Security Council: "We welcome the U.S. Nunn-Lugar plan and believe in its fast implementation, with the understanding that the money should be invested in Russia, not outside it."
State Duma Subcommittee on Arms Control Vyacheslav Nikonov	Positive Nikonov remains skeptical of DOD's effectiveness in implementing CTR, and has indicated a preference for the Department of Energy to become general contractor of the program on the U.S. side.
State Duma Committee on Defense Sergei Yushenkov	Positive Generally positive, but disappointed at the lack of progress with the chemical weapons destruction program.
^a Author's interview with Yuri Baturin, president's aide for national security, December 1994.	

responsible for these delays. We've received much less equipment than was promised. Moreover, the assistance we get is mostly assistance to U.S. companies, not to us. The Americans offered us a total of \$400 million [in CTR assistance]. But in 1994, we lost \$400 million because the Americans did not open for us free, nonprotectionist access to the U.S. uranium market [for sales of surplus Russian enriched uranium]. We could sell uranium and our advanced technologies overseas if there were no

protectionist barriers. We could invest the profits—into improvements in Russian MPC&A systems, containers, and so on.¹⁶

Other sources in Minatom have stressed their dissatisfaction with the way DOD implements the CTR Program. They would prefer to deal with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), which, from their experience, appears to produce more concrete results. For example, in the first year of the program, DOD lost spending authority for \$218 million of its original \$400 million Fiscal Year (FY) 1992 budget authorization due to its failure to obligate the funds in a timely manner. Minatom sources claim that they were fully prepared to spend this money to solve urgent problems. In another example, DOD spent \$8 million in CTR funds on heavy equipment, such as bulldozers and road graders, although there is no shortage of these in Russia. These Minatom sources have also said that, based on past experience, lab-to-lab cooperation is much more attractive than cooperation at the government-to-government level.

These tensions notwithstanding, there are several encouraging examples of U.S.-Russian technical cooperation for threat reduction. At the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) in Obninsk, for example, the United States has used CTR assistance funds to create an MPC&A system that is now in use. Scientists at the facility where the system was installed have said that control and accounting of up to 96 percent of the facility's plutonium and highly enriched uranium were less than ideal in the past. Blocks of fissile material differed widely in weight and composition and were practically impossible to track within the facility. Moreover, facility portals lacked an advanced control system. As one of these scientists has observed, "We haven't had any case of nuclear smuggling, ... but theoretically it cannot be excluded. The U.S. system and equipment is what we need."¹⁷

Despite the apparent enthusiasm among specialists at Minatom facilities for cooperating with the United States to improve MPC&A capabilities, IPPE Director Viktor Murogov is generally skeptical about the role that U.S. aid can play in reducing proliferation risks in Russia:

You should understand that the \$250 million allotted by the Americans to Mayak¹⁸ is a small sum. If you investigate the problem, you will see that we have been losing at least that much money supplying Ukraine with fuel to compensate for its transfer of warheads. Minister Mikhailov is constantly criticizing it, and he has a point: the American aid very often doesn't help us. It would be better if we used Mayak as a testing ground for developing new technologies, including technologies from third countries, as well as for the utilization of plutonium from third countries.¹⁹

By contrast, the Russian MOD has had a very positive view of CTR implementation, particularly as it pertains to strategic offensive arms elimination. Nonetheless, MOD officials privately voice their concern over U.S. attempts to pressure Russia to undertake CTR projects at specific facilities, with close involvement by U.S. personnel. These concerns center around the Mayak facility and the Elektrostal plant, which produces fuel for naval reactors. Sources in the Russian MOD have insisted that for CTR to be a "cooperative" program, it should maximize reciprocity, such as through reciprocal exchanges at U.S. and Russian facilities, such as Mayak and the Hanford facility in Washington state.

A key organization in the Russian MOD is the 12th Main Directorate, which is responsible for nuclear weapons operations and is headed by General Evgenii Maslin. Responding to criticism of U.S. motivations and the use of the CTR Program as a means of supporting U.S. contractors, General Maslin has observed:

Any country would do the same as the U.S. has been doing—helping their own companies first and Russia next.... They allocate funds, but do it for their own manufacturers. Let's take the supercontainers example (we call this type of container "TPD"). Of course, we could build such containers, and we actually have been building them. Such TPDs cost 32 million rubles a month ago. Now it might cost 50 million rubles. The supercontainers the Americans have been delivering to us are absolutely free of charge to the Russian MOD. Why not make use of them? There is a point of view that they want to disarm us. But this is only natural. Americans have been afraid of us for a long time; they still are, and they will be for some time in

16. "Interview with Viktor Mikhailov," *Yadernyi Kontrol*, No. 2 (1995), pp. 9-11.

17. Author's interview with a research scientist at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE), Obninsk, May 1995.

18. Mayak, also known as Chelyabinsk-65, is the nuclear complex at which a central storage facility is being built for nuclear materials from disassembled nuclear weapons.

19. Author's interview with IPPE Director Viktor Murogov, May 1995. A version of this interview is reprinted in *Yadernyi Kontrol*, No. 7 (1995), pp. 9-11.

the future. But we try to see that the agreements we conclude are mutually beneficial. As far as the Nunn-Lugar Program is concerned, Americans have been fulfilling their commitments very well. They ask us what we need most. So we asked for another 600 containers. We suggested they design carriages that can be used in emergencies, special railway cars. They could supply computer equipment, which is one of the weakest points of our industries, to establish a reliable accounting and control system. I think that all the proposals by Americans have to take into consideration Russia's national security. The signed agreements fully reflect the demands of national security. If we have money, then we will be able to do that—ourselves. But now what we can do is accept U.S. aid and thank them for it.²⁰

Table 5-2 displays, on a simple scale, general attitudes about implementation of current CTR projects by key CTR decision-making bodies in the Russian government and parliament. In sum, Russian officials have cited the following as the main obstacles to CTR implementation: attempts to make CTR assistance conditional and to link the funding to Russian-Iranian nuclear contracts; slow implementation and obligations of funds by the United States; expenditure of the lion's share of CTR funds in the United States on U.S. contractors, rather than giving the money directly to Russian enterprises; extreme bureaucratization of the process by DOD, making government-to-government cooperation much less effective than lab-to-lab cooperation; and the small number of U.S. specialists sent to Russia to assist in CTR implementation.

Russian Bureaucratic Competition

Another key problem for effective implementation of the CTR Program where Russia is concerned is the bureaucratic competition that exists within the Russian executive branch. Ministries and other executive structures compete fiercely for influence in the decision-making process. Related to this is the severe lack of coordination among Russian official institutions on political-military issues. Competing or overlapping agendas can be identified among a number of executive agencies, although on particular issues traditional rivals may become partners.

20. "Interview with Evgenii Maslin," *Yadernyi Kontrol*, No. 5 (1995), p. 11.

Table 5-2. Evaluation of the Current Stage of CTR Projects for Russia.

Project	Minatom	MOD	Duma Committee on Defense	President's Office
Int'l Science & Technology Center ^a	Good	Good	Good	Good
Defense Conversion	Very poor	Poor	Poor	Very poor
Nuclear Emergency Response Equipment and Training	Excellent	Excellent	?	?
Export Controls Assistance	Very poor	Very poor	Very poor	Very poor
MPC&A ^b	Very poor	Good	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination	Not applicable	Excellent	Poor	Satisfactory
Chemical Weapons Destruction	Very poor	Poor	Very poor	Very poor
Fissile Material Containers ^c	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
Armored Blankets ^d	Satisfactory	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
Fissile Material Storage Facility	Satisfactory	Not applicable	Satisfactory	Excellent
Enhanced Rail Car Security	Good	Excellent	Good	Good

^a The Duma should ratify the agreement.
^b More active involvement by the U.S. Department of Energy would be welcome, as it appears to have greater technical expertise in this area than the Department of Defense.
^c Project finished.
^d Project finished.

Competition among Russian decision-making bodies has been a critical stumbling block to U.S. and Russian partners developing workable implementation plans in a timely fashion. Too often the Russian government appears to speak with multiple, contradictory voices on particular issues relevant to CTR. Moreover, implementation

of particular CTR projects has frequently been stalled because of a lack of clear lines of responsibility within the Russian bureaucracy, a condition that has been aggravated by frequent presidential decrees creating new oversight bodies or assigning new bureaucratic responsibilities to particular agencies at the expense of others. Competition between Minatom and the Federal Atomic Inspectorate (Gosatomnadzor, or GAN) for control of CTR programs to improve nuclear facility safety and security and competing mandates between the MOD and the Committee on Convention-Related CBW Issues regarding chemical weapons destruction are both notorious examples of this dynamic at work. Although the problem of bureaucratic competition and miscoordination has been repeatedly discussed at the level of the President's Office, no effective solution has yet been found. One approach, likely to be implemented in the near future, is to establish an interagency coordinating bureau under the Defense Council of the Russian Federation with oversight of military and foreign policy issues.

The Role of the Russian Media and Non-governmental Organizations

Until recently, the Russian media has paid scant attention to the CTR Program. What news or opinions were voiced on the program's implementation in its first few years were generally neither positive nor negative. Beginning in May 1995, however, there was more coverage than usual about the CTR Program in the Russian media; most was devoted to attempts by the U.S. Congress to reduce or even freeze financial assistance to Russia.²¹ *Izvestia* was very critical of the decision of the U.S. House of Representatives to cut CTR funding. It referred to the \$171 million in assistance that was first confirmed and then frozen by the House as a "stump of aid."²² *Kommersant Daily* was even more critical, especially of the suggestion to link nuclear threat reduction assistance to ambiguous "biological suspicions."²³

After months of barely acknowledging CTR activities, the Russian media started to paint a very negative image of the CTR Program. Through mid-1996 there were few if any positive comments on CTR

implementation in the nation's media. This suggests that the Russian government and its ministries have failed to work with the media to portray the CTR Program in a more positive light for Russian public opinion. In fact, no press release on the CTR Program has ever been published and distributed to the central media by Russian authorities. The only place in Moscow where interested journalists can find adequate information about CTR Program implementation is the U.S. Embassy, and only one newspaper, *Kommersant Daily*, provides more or less regular information about CTR developments. Skepticism on the part of some Russian government officials regarding the effectiveness of the CTR Program affects their comments to the press or results in the absence of any comments at all.

With a few exceptions, including the Center for Political Research in Russia (PIR Center), Russian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and research centers generally have paid little attention in their research programs to CTR implementation in Russia. Thus they have not played any role in influencing distribution of CTR funds in Russia or in recommending better uses for these funds. The experience of the PIR Center demonstrates, however, that decision-makers, on the whole, are interested in involving NGOs in the dialogue on the CTR Program. Governmental officials who wish to make their comments and recommendations on CTR implementation known to the United States have sometimes preferred to use NGOs as an indirect and nongovernmental way to disseminate such comments.

The role of NGOs in assisting Russian officials to improve the CTR Program is very limited but nonetheless can be very useful. It is limited because of the lack of a tradition of government-NGO dialogue in Russia. However, the situation has slowly started to change for the better. Russian government officials and especially legislators increasingly are seeking more descriptive information and analytical materials about future Russian involvement in the CTR Program, about the difficulties and obstacles of that involvement, about the position of U.S. officials, and about relevant discussions at international seminars and workshops. Increasingly, NGOs are being asked to supply decision-makers with information and analysis about the CTR Program. By meeting these information dissemination needs, NGOs in Russia are beginning to have an influence, albeit indirectly, on the CTR process. Organizing seminars and workshops on Nunn-Lugar implementation, stressing such issues as conversion, MPC&A, and strategic offensive arms elimination, would be a second way that Russian NGOs could

21. *Izvestia*, June 17, 1995, p. 3; and *Kommersant Daily*, June 15, 1995, pp. 1, 3.

22. *Izvestia*, June 17, 1995, p. 3.

23. *Kommersant Daily*, June 15, 1995, pp. 1, 3.

influence this process. However, as yet there is no practice of Russian NGOs organizing such seminars. A key factor in this regard is the financial dependence of the seminar organizers on the Russian government and its ministries.

Conclusions

In its early months, the CTR Program faced considerable opposition in Russia from Russian parliamentarians and the public at large. Suspicion of U.S. motives in offering to assist Russian nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation goals was a natural consequence of more than 40 years of distrust and fear of the West. Eventual approval and broader support for cooperative threat reduction in these critical early months were due in large part to the strong voices of support emanating from the Russian Ministry of Defense, Minatom, and other Russian bureaucracies, who argued that cooperation with the United States was critical to meeting the complex military-technical demands of Russia's arms control and nuclear security requirements. The support of these organizations, in turn, was the direct result of the enthusiastic offers of assistance from key legislators and policymakers in the United States.

This bureaucratic consensus in Russia in favor of cooperation with the West has eroded considerably, and many of the individuals who once provided key support to the CTR Program have become outspoken critics of its delays and mismanagement. Implementation problems, including administrative delays and complex auditing requirements on the part of the United States and the underutilization of local Russian enterprises to perform CTR tasks, have soured key bureaucratic players on U.S.-Russian cooperation. Moreover, the CTR Program has been caught up in the larger political mood, manifest in the December 1995 electoral gains of Russian Communists and ultranationalists, that has turned against cooperation with the West and has come to see such cooperation as a means for the United States to further weaken Russian national capabilities. Aggravating this tension is the increasingly vocal chorus of criticism from legislators and opinion-makers in the United States who have come to regard assistance to Russia as a means of influencing or forcing Russian policy on a number of unrelated political or military issues.

Rebuilding the bureaucratic consensus that once existed for U.S.-Russian cooperation will require a number of steps. At a minimum, current and future assistance projects must be implemented in a way

that does not waste CTR funds and makes better use of indigenous Russian personnel and technical resources for cooperative projects. The administrative waste and delays that have slowed critical assistance programs have only encouraged cynicism on the part of Russian bureaucratic players and the public at large. Winning back the support of these individuals, who are crucial to the overall demilitarization process, will require a number of administrative changes, some of which are already under way and some of which have been suggested by Russian officials themselves. Granting the U.S. Department of Energy greater oversight of MPC&A activities with Russia, for example, may be the best way to reduce the burdensome administrative delays that have hamstrung DOD activities in this area. Given the preference of Minatom officials for working with DOE, this simple measure may be enough to rebuild a strong working relationship between the United States and Minatom.

U.S. officials should also recognize that there are many voices within the Russian bureaucracy involved in CTR implementation who remain generally or strongly supportive of the program but have been discouraged by recent problems. A greater degree of flexibility on the part of the United States, such as providing more of the contracts for CTR activities to local Russian enterprises, is likely to help reduce program costs and delays even as it promotes greater goodwill on the part of Russian participants. In this vein, U.S. legislators may want to reconsider their linkage of CTR assistance to a variety of problems in U.S.-Russian bilateral relations.

For its part, the current government in Moscow must redouble its efforts to resolve the bureaucratic disputes that have delayed implementation of time-urgent demilitarization and risk-reduction activities. It also must try to do a much better job with its own public diplomacy in support of the CTR program. At a minimum, the Russian government must make a greater effort to keep the Russian public and interested opinion-makers informed of the status and successes of U.S.-Russian cooperation. In the absence of any official support for the CTR Program, bureaucratic inertia and criticism have been allowed to erode the special relationship that might have evolved with the United States from joint demilitarization efforts. Russian NGOs have begun to play a role, albeit tentatively, in building such channels of communication. Similarly, these organizations and their equivalents abroad could play a role in reinvigorating the dialogue between key Russian decision-makers, legislators, and opinion-makers with their American counter-

parts. Achieving this would be a first step in rebuilding a groundswell of support for the CTR Program and U.S.-Russian cooperation in general. It could demonstrate to Russians the tangible benefits of CTR assistance and demonstrate to U.S. decision-makers the urgent need for and real self-interest of this venture.

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