

ANALYSIS

**MOSCOW NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY SUMMIT:
SUMMING UP THE RESULTS**

by *Vladimir Orlov*
The PIR Center Director

All rights reserved. The publication may not be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in whole or in part, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without written permission of the Publisher

For letters
and subscription orders
16/2 Tverskaya Street, #201,
Moscow News Building, Moscow
103835, Russia
e-mail: <info@pircenter.org>
phone/fax (7-095) 229--16-50
(7-502) 225-17-24
phone (7-095) 434-92-88

Internet:
<<http://www.online.ru/sp/pir>>

Home Page:
<<http://www.pircenter.org>>

Editorial Board

Amb. Roland Timerbaev,
Chairman
Vladimir Orlov, Editor,
Yaderny Kontrol monthly
Masha Katsva, Editor,
Yaderny Kontrol Digest
Violetta Degtyareva,
Translator
Darrell Stanaford,
Michael Beck, Copy-writers,
Yaderny Kontrol Digest

The Project Director
wishes to express special
thanks to the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies
of the Monterey Institute
of International Studies
for making this publica-
tion possible through its
support of the Center for
Policy Studies in Russia
(PIR Center)

Signed for printing
on July 11, 1996

Leaders of the world's seven major industrialized nations (the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan) and Russia gathered in Moscow on April 19 and 20 to discuss nuclear security issues. It was the first ever G-7 Summit held in Russia. For the first time the Summit agenda dealt with one specific issue that directly concerns these states and the whole world – the future of nuclear power engineering and its safety. It was also the first time that Russia participated in discussions on equal terms: this was reflected by the fact that diplomats called it the P-8 Nuclear Safety Summit.

Two months have passed since the end of the Summit and it is high time to unbiasedly evaluate its results. First and foremost, we should clarify why the Moscow Summit has received such little attention, and why there have been many who contend that "there was no real need for the Summit" and that "elephants bore a mouse." Are these reproaches well-founded?

Expectations and Results

In order to answer this question, let us take a look at the pre-Summit period. According to Boris Yeltsin, at the June 1995 G-7 Summit in the Canadian city of Halifax, he "suggested to his colleagues that nuclear safety issues be discussed at a Summit in Moscow. The idea was supported, although not immediately and rather unwillingly. Nevertheless, this way Russia was recognized not only as a great power, but also as a leading world state."¹ Commenting on the initial cold reception of Yeltsin's initiative, Jacques Chirac pointed out, "In Halifax, President Yeltsin said, 'I have an idea: I would like to discuss civilian nuclear safety problems'. I must say that initially there was some doubt, but Boris Yeltsin insisted, so everybody agreed."²

Indeed, Yeltsin's initiative voiced in Halifax became a sensation. How could it be that Russia, which had always been reproached for inadequate nuclear material protection, control and accounting as well as for excessive secrecy regarding direct and indirect data about its military nuclear program, all of a sudden suggest nuclear issues be given a priority on the Summit agenda. Does this mean that Russia is finally ready for greater transparency or is it some diplomatic trick? The phrase "nuclear safety" caused confusion. What did it stipulate – "safety", which means civilian nuclear power engineering safety, or "security", which was the first translation of Yeltsin's idea, which means military security issues are included as well? Bill Clinton, being the first to welcome Yeltsin's initiative in Halifax, immediately suggested that the Summit agenda should also contain issues concerning nuclear smuggling, including combating potential thefts of nuclear small yield charges.³ Russia obviously did not like this, it explained that only safety issues are supposed to be discussed, first of all safety at nuclear power plants (NPPs) and nuclear waste management.

The G-7 accepted Clinton's proposal, but it took their experts and governments a long time to discuss it, and it seemed to be on the verge of dropping out at some moments. Thus, according to a top Russian official who took part in preparations for the Summit, in August 1995 "it hung by a thread" and many, including those in the Kremlin, contemplated back-peddling. The format of the Summit also was not clear. Thus, sometimes it was proposed to hold a "conference" and to invite China and Ukraine, in addition to the G-8 states; even Norway was once among those states that insisted on having their representatives at the "nuclear safety and security forum". Only after long consultations was defined the format of the meeting as the P-8 Summit and Ukraine's President invited to take part in the breakfast and in discussions on the Chernobyl issue (a similar request of Belarus's President Alexander Lukashenko was not even seriously considered). As a compromise, the meeting was called "Nuclear Safety and Security Summit", though it was agreed that the Summit preparations and the Summit would focus primarily on civilian nuclear power engineering and related nuclear safety issues and only briefly touch nuclear nonproliferation issues and not touch nuclear weapons problems altogether (the day before the Summit, Yeltsin phoned Clinton and reminded him of this agreement once again). Also, it was difficult to find a mutually convenient time. Initially the Summit was planned for March and finally it was agreed on April 19 and 20: bilateral meetings on April 19, the Nuclear Safety and Security Summit on April 20, and the Yeltsin-Clinton meeting on April 21. It was agreed that Boris Yeltsin and Jacques Chirac would be Co-Chairmen at the Summit.

It is worth noting that from the very beginning the G-8 refused to set specific objectives to be reached at the Summit. Just the opposite, it was general issues that received priority (they were to be discussed very briefly, without going into details) and it was planned to adopt general declarative documents. According to their authors, these documents should indicate the common character of the G-8 objectives regarding nuclear safety and security issues and nonproliferation issues and should not point out to some specific "backlog". The only exception was a joint Statement on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), though it was not planned to contain any new information, apart from a joint affirmation of their prior statements on this subject.

The G-7 leaders agreed to make the discussion "sterile", e.g. not to raise acute problems altogether. According to Izvestia's report from Bonn made before the meeting, "the next favor of the Federal Chancellor to the Russian president (...) this time will be that he will just "be silent" regarding acute problems instead of discussing them at the G-7 Nuclear Safety and Security Summit. Those in Bonn

EDITORIAL

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES. WILL THEY LEAD TO A NON-NUCLEAR WORLD?

*By Roland Timerbaev
The PIR Center President
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, retired*

Relaxation of nuclear confrontation between the key nuclear-weapon powers, although yet not stable enough, provides an incentive to seek more radical solutions of the nuclear problem. Some regions in the world are actively seeking ways to create nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs). Recently two more NWFZs have been added to the old ones in *Latin America* and the *South Pacific*. The first regional treaty was concluded in Bangkok last December, and the treaty establishing an *African nuclear-weapon-free zone* is expected to be signed in Cairo on April 11. All five of the nuclear-weapon powers — Russia, the United States, China, Britain and France — have been invited to the signing ceremony.

Practically all states in the zones, numbering more than a hundred, are parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT), which was indefinitely extended last May. This means that all of them have undertaken not to create nuclear weapons. However, all of these states are also seeking ways to strengthen their non-nuclear status — this time at the regional level. Why?

The answer is that a NWFZ provides them with enhanced security. Unlike the NPT, regional treaties prohibit not only production of nuclear weapons, but also stationing of such weapons that belong to nuclear-weapon powers on the territory of the region (they prohibit even temporary and transit — while transporting by sea or by air — stationing). The zones give their members another important advantage — legally mandatory security safeguards of their non-nuclear status, which the NPT does not give. These safeguards are given in the form of the nuclear-weapon powers' adherence to a special protocol which is an integral part of the regional treaty.

The model created by these zones has attracted the attention of the other regions of the world. Arab states, led by Egypt, have been more actively raising the issue of creating a *NWFZ in the Middle East*. The current process of political settlement there under the aegis of the United States and Russia is establishing certain preconditions for creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone or a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Of course Israel is not going to easily part with its nuclear potential, but its leadership has already begun to think over whether their negative stance prevents progress toward establishing a true and lasting peace in a region incessantly inflamed with armed conflicts and terrorist acts. It is not by chance that Israel's Prime Minister Shimon Peres has recently stated, "Give me peace and we will renounce our nuclear program."

Prospects for creating a NWFZ are more uncertain in South Asia because of the nuclear potentials of two rival states — *India* and *Pakistan*, which, moreover, have been struggling over Kashmir for many years. Unlike the *Middle East*, where the problem can be resolved at the regional level, India flatly rejects the local approach, arguing that it has global interests and needs deterrent capabilities not only against Pakistan, but other states as well. To all appearances, India will agree to shrink its nuclear capabilities only if its northern neighbor, China, along with the other nuclear-weapon powers will do the same.

Nonetheless, certain mutual relaxation and confidence-building measures can be carried out even here: in the region which bears the highest risk of a nuclear conflict and is close to Russia's and the other CIS states' borders. Neither the Soviet Union, nor today's Russia have been paying sufficient attention to how to settle and diminish nuclear confrontation between the two countries on the Indian subcontinent. In our opinion, Russia has a lot of unused resources for doing so, which could strengthen Russia's and its southern neighbor states' security and boost Russia's international standing in the region and in the world.

The global tendency to resolve the nuclear problem at the regional level extends to new regions as well. Some time ago Belarus sponsored an initiative to create a *NWFZ from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea*, which would cover states in Central and Eastern Europe. These states are parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and they would be happy to receive more reliable safeguards, which is but a natural desire, given the fact that neither strategic nor political stability has been reached on the continent.


It is well-known that some of the Central and Eastern Europe countries want to join NATO, but do they really want to and does it correspond to their interests if NATO's nuclear weapons are deployed on their territories? When Germany was reunited, it was agreed in the Treaty on the final settlement in Germany of September 1990 that neither NATO nuclear weapons nor their delivery systems would be deployed on the former GDR's territory. This is an important precedent and it would be reasonable to develop it and to legally consolidate a fully non-nuclear status of Central and Eastern Europe, in other words to establish a NWFZ there.

In the United Nations Kirgiz government put forward a similar suggestion regarding creating a NWFZ in Central Asia.

The newly independent states in *Central Asia* have for a long time been a testing ground for various nuclear experiments and exercises. There is the former testing ground in Semipalatinsk, a production association for research on nuclear rocket engines, experimental nuclear reactors, the Ulba plant fabricating nuclear power engineering fuel, uranium mines, and many other facilities. There used to be silo-based launchers of heavy multiple warhead nuclear missiles. The Chinese nuclear testing ground in Lobnor is also not far away.

Specialists and analysts in Central Asia are currently actively discussing the expediency of the fully non-nuclear status that would be consolidated by an international legal instrument. Of course, creating of NWFZs is a matter of states' free-will.

However, it appears obvious that such zones are gradually paving the way to a non-nuclear world and to the complete liberation of mankind from the nuclear sword of Damocles.



continued from p.1

assume that the Moscow Summit will be an "empty words" forum. Though Russia's Western partners are going to join Boris Yeltsin and affirm their adherence to the nuclear safety and security principles in a final declaration, they are likely to leave the most debatable issues outside the forum. Germany and its Western partners have agreed not to be lavish with financial promises to Moscow, not to promise new credits and to generally avoid delicate subjects with a due consideration to the election situation. Of course, Germans are concerned with nuclear reactors safety in Russia in particular and with Russian NPPs safety in general, but not to such an extent as to miss a chance to support Boris Yeltsin at a difficult moment. And an official agreement will be just such a support.⁵

The other G-7 leaders were more or less of the same opinion.

Russian commentators in the know also did not have any allusions regarding the G-8 Summit. According to Pavel Feldgenhauer, "in Moscow the world leaders will mostly just voice reports prepared beforehand by competent departments. Professional politicians did not understand much about complicated nuclear technical issues and had to completely rely on specialists even during the more tense times of the Cold War. Nowadays the eight great powers have no disagreements regarding nuclear safety and security issues altogether."⁶

In this connection it would be logical to raise a question: why was this Summit needed, which provoked so much noise and which cost the Russian tax-payer, according to some data, approximately 15 billion rubles?

The first answer is that Boris Yeltsin needed it to secure support of the Western leaders before the presidential elections on June 16; the Western leaders needed it to carry out "an express analysis" of the election situation in Russia and in the Kremlin. Commenting on these speculations, Presidential Aide for National Security Yuri Baturin said the following, "Of course, sometimes they say that this Summit was a kind of election measure. But I should say that *the decision to hold it was made when election measures were not planned altogether*. It was up to the G-7 leaders and to Russia to choose the Summit date. It did not depend only on Russia: that is why it would be wrong to think that the Summit was timed to the elections. But during the election period any measure, any action, any step or even absence or rejection of some actions, no doubt, receive a touch of some election campaign (...). In case of its success, it will, of course, increase the prestige of the president who had initiated this meeting, who was its co-chairman and its host, and it will positively effect his election campaign."⁷

Today it difficult to say whether the presidential aide was cunning, saying that Yeltsin's "election measures were not planned altogether" a year ago, or was it actually so (the second alternative appears to be more probable if we remember the domestic situation in June 1995). In any case, even if we assume that it was not mere coincidence that the G-7 leaders came to Moscow at the same time when Yeltsin began his election campaign, the Summit did not considerably influence the election situation in Russia.

On the one hand, during the two days of the Summit Yeltsin behaved as a good host: one could feel it at the receptions and in his renovated cabinet in the Kremlin. Combined with his good physical shape, this produced a favorable impression on the guests. On entering the renovated Yekaterininsky hall, Clinton exclaimed, "Gorgeous!" Jacques Chirac was the most rapturous one, "I like Moscow very much. I come here from time to time and I see that the city has been changing at an enormous, fantastic speed. Again we can observe the capital of the great Russia and this makes me happy. Today, looking at Moscow, at Saint-Petersburg and at other cities, one gets an impression that *the great Russia is back* from day to day, and right now this makes me extremely satisfied. I would like to thank Boris Yeltsin for his reception and to tell him that the reception in the Kremlin greatly surprised me. I had been to the Kremlin before, but it was in a pitiful condition then. And [this time] I entered these new buildings, which have regained their former magnificence, with a great joy. Dear Boris Nikolayevich, I thank you for this."⁸ From Yeltsin's team's perspective, the meeting must have been worth being held in Moscow even if only for this praise.

On the other hand, it seems to be more than artificial to link the Moscow Summit to the average Russian elector's mood. As a matter of fact, those who were going to support Yeltsin considered the Summit to be one of his diplomatic successes. Those against Yeltsin must have been only irritated with Moscow's readiness "to be led by the West" and to agree, for example, with a

complete nuclear test ban. The hesitating voter was hardly to be influenced by the Summit's results: foreign policy steps play a far smaller role than economic ones in the average elector's eyes. At the same time, if we consider the Summit impact on the June 16 elections, then we should admit that "presentation" of its results (especially the TV presentation) must have promoted Yeltsin rather than alienating a part of the hesitating electorate.

Considering the G-7 leaders' Moscow visit, we should focus on the effectiveness of Moscow's one year old foreign policy step. Indeed, the majority of these leaders spoke so much about nuclear safety and security problem, often reproaching Russia, that it was difficult for them to refuse Yeltsin's proposal and not to come to Moscow. Seizing the initiative, Russia brushed off its opponents' arguments regarding its unwillingness to resolve nuclear safety and security problems and proved that, despite colossal financial problems, it continues to advocate improvement of legal, diplomatic and technical aspects of nuclear safety and security. The Summit made it difficult to blame Russia for poor attention to these issues. It is not by chance that Chirac gave a very curt answer to a reporter's question regarding "the confusion with the nuclear material safety in Russia", "It might have been said four or five years ago, but today nobody says this, because *this is nonsense*. We have in detail discussed safety and security problems with appropriate information [at our hands], there were serious people round the table and nobody doubted those safety and security-enhancing measures that Russia has been undertaking. And I tell you this quite frankly."⁹ The situation was spiced up with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's statement, which was made less than two weeks before this statement of France's President and in which he described the situation with safety and security at Russian nuclear facilities "from Murmansk to Vladivostok" as very poor.¹⁰

It is no coincidence that Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhailov, looked quite happy after the meeting was over, and in his interview with Yaderny Kontrol he said that "the forecasts of the press that just the day before predicted the Western leaders would pinprick Russia have been proved wrong. There were no pinpricks and no reproaches. Instead there was support of Russia's efforts and a constructive talk on cooperation."

Thus, Russia's expectations regarding the Summit have been one hundred percent justified since it successfully fulfilled its two major objectives: first, to show the strength of the Kremlin's "master" and, second, to underline Russia's adherence to an effective solution of nuclear safety and security problems and its readiness to cooperate with the G-7.

As far as expectations of the world public are concerned, they must have been initially overstated. Indeed, it sufficed to have a look at the Summit program to realize that nuclear safety and security problems would take no more than a few hours or even less. Given the fact that each of the participants had to have his say, it became obvious that the discussion mostly had a formal character and that all documents had been agreed to before: it was important that these documents were not reviewed during the Summit. In other words, could one really expect that a three-hour discussion would bring about some "breakthrough", moreover that it was not clear what "breakthrough" was actually expected. It is obvious that the format of such meetings, as a rule, does not stipulate a plan for resolving specific problems. In addition, the Summit participants devoted a considerable amount of time to the situation in the South Lebanon, a problem unrelated to nuclear safety and security but which demanded fast reaction from Clinton, Chirac and Yeltsin.

Four documents were adopted on the Summit results¹¹ — the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration, the Programme for Preventing and Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material, the Statement on Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the Statement on Ukraine.

The Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration

The Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration testifies to the effect that the Summit was a meeting of leaders of states that have (with the exception of Italy, which gave up on building its own NPPs and imports nuclear power from France) no substantive disagreements regarding the nuclear power use-related issues. As Boris Yeltsin said, greeting his guests in the Kremlin, "Major nuclear power producing powers are represented

at the Moscow Summit. Eighty percent of nuclear reactors possessed by mankind are located on their territories. This fact alone makes obvious our special common responsibility for strengthening the nuclear power sector safety and security. I do not want to deny the need to diversify the energy sources and to continue the research in the area of alternative energy options. Still, the development of nuclear and, further on, thermonuclear power should be considered today as the most promising one."¹² The leaders declared that they consider the XXIst century to be a century with an important role of nuclear power engineering, they affirmed their commitment to "measures which will enable nuclear power, already a significant contributor to electricity supply in those countries choosing to exploit it, to continue in the next century to play an important role in meeting future world energy demand consistent with the goal of sustainable development agreed at the Rio Conference in 1992."¹³

The following G-8 statement appears to be very timely: "We recognize the importance of openness and transparency to obtain public trust which is a key factor for the use of nuclear energy."¹⁴ It is important that this statement occupies a very important place in the Declaration. It is true that there is a long way to transparency, especially in Russia; but I would like to hope that Russia will back up this clause of the Declaration with actions. "Public trust" constitutes an even more serious problem. Though President Yeltsin considers "it important that specific objectives of nuclear power engineering should be solved in close cooperation with the public", believes in "the practice of conducting public examination, alongside the state one, of specific nuclear power facilities", and asserts, "We will continue promoting relations with Russian and international public in the future"¹⁵, "Nikitin's case" makes it considerably more difficult to believe these words. It is interesting to point out that the day before the Summit, Yuri Baturin conjectured that "Nikitin's case" might be discussed during the meeting and "some solution might be found". However, this was not the case. The same Yuri Baturin hinted that the accused must have been directly or indirectly using secret data of a Bellona's open report. However, this does not dismiss the question whether data containing information regarding an environmental threat can be classified. This point should be clarified by Russian and international legislation.

At the same time the following arouses concern. Despite President Yeltsin's statement made at the April Summit regarding the necessity of a joint Russia/Scandinavian States monitoring of the territories of radioactive concern, Russia's Defense Minister, Pavel Grachev, failed to find time in May jointly with his Norwegian colleague to start such monitoring at Andreyeva Guba in the Murmansk Region, about which military naval bases with serious radioactive situations about which we have already written.¹⁶

The G-8 participants, though not touching issues related to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, paid considerable attention to it in the final Declaration. It is worth noting that the Declaration refers to the Decision of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference on principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament as to the key document. The G-8 states intend, following the letter and spirit of this resolution, to strengthen cooperation in the area of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, including promotion of universal adherence to the NPT. This problem appears to be the most urgent one. A year after the decision on the NPT indefinite extension was reached in New York, one of the most important requirements of the Conference participants— to make the Treaty comprehensive, universal, e.g. provide for adherence of undeclared nuclear-weapon states, namely India, Pakistan and Israel, had not been fulfilled. It is obvious that it would be naive to speak about "forceful adherence" to the Treaty. However, "the nuclear five" have not undertaken effective efforts to push the three above-mentioned states toward the international regime of nuclear nonproliferation. The United States, Britain and Russia — the states-co-authors of the Final Resolution of the 1995 Conference on the Middle East, which, in particular, reaffirms "the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards." Moreover, the resolution calls in particular upon "the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems."¹⁷

Though, Sergei Kislyak, Director of Russia's Foreign Ministry's department for security and disarmament, does not agree that no efforts to universalize the Treaty were made during the previous year, "Efforts have been undertaken, they are being undertaken every day. They have been undertaken within the framework of multilateral efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and Russia has been playing an active role. We have close contacts with our partners in India as well. We have been conducting an open and honest dialogue, stressing our interest that the Indian colleagues adhere to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We have been negotiating on these issues with the other depositaries of the Treaty on Nonproliferation — with the Americans and with the British. This work has never stopped and will continue in the future."¹⁸ Answering a Yaderny Kontrol question, Kislyak evaluated the nonproliferation-related provisions of the Moscow Declaration as "adequately coordinated statements favoring strengthening the nonproliferation regime. This has been and continues to be Russia's position."¹⁹

The Moscow Declaration underlined that the 1994 Convention on nuclear security was "the most important achievement". The G-8 "urge all countries to sign this Convention and to complete internal procedures so that the Convention can be brought into force expeditiously, certainly before the end of 1996."²⁰ Russia stated that this Convention has already entered into force on its territory.²¹

The Moscow Declaration stated the G-8 intention to work "vigorously to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system."²² The IAEA underwent a serious test when it failed to detect Iraq's illicit nuclear activities. And in other cases it was not the Agency, but specific states, first of all the United States, that played a major role in preventing or stopping illicit nuclear activities of a number of rogue states. All this had made the IAEA more vulnerable than ever for critics. Some of the Agency's opponents even tried to push the idea of its absolute uselessness. It seems that the G-8, in a very timely fashion, determined their stance toward the IAEA. Russia's position at the Summit was also remarkable. Its essence was that "it is important to support the Agency's activities aimed at strengthening safeguards, and to create and implement an effective mechanism for detection of possible clandestine nuclear activities at initial stages, especially in regions of proliferation concern." Russia believes that "there is an urgent need to strengthen the IAEA safeguards regime by including control over non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons." Russian officials and scientists have been very concerned with this issue. Moreover there has been joint U.S./Russia research in this direction within the framework of the International Center for Science and Technology. Russia insists that it is a direct responsibility of the world's leading industrialized states that "the Agency should be provided with financial and human resources, equipment and legal rights to effectively carry out its control functions."²³

Finally, the Moscow Declaration reaffirms the G-8 commitment to "the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."²⁴ It seems that the development of such an international legal document will start immediately after the conclusion of a CTBT. And the G-7 leaders should attach as much importance to these negotiations as they attach to the negotiations on a CTBT.

The G-8 agreed to work out their strategies concerning storage of fissile materials, which were claimed to be of no further use for defense purposes. Possible options included safe and secure long-term storage, classification, other methods of final burial and conversion into MOX fuel for nuclear reactors. The Summit participants welcomed the plans regarding small-scale technology demonstrations of these options, including the possibility of creating pilot projects and plants.

The decision was made to hold a meeting of a Nuclear Proliferation Experts Group (NPEG) until the end of 1996 in France to analyze the various proposed disposition options and to determine the possible development of international cooperation to implement the national strategies.

Illicit Nuclear Trafficking

It is no secret that during the Summit Russia considered this issue "provocative." It was assumed that if somebody from the G-7 wanted to pressure Russia, he would play up this very "card." Though Russian officials were sure that they could beat it: in particular, they said that there was no nuclear smuggling of proliferation scale from Russia and named Western companies that used to export nuclear components to Iraq with their governments' permission, nevertheless, they preferred to avoid this delicate subject. Number one, Russian officials who prepared the Summit knew (better than others) that the situation with nuclear material protection, accounting and control was far from being satisfactory. Number two, there has been almost no control (at least until recently) over transborder movements of nuclear and radioactive material and, as a result, a shining example of illicit export of radioactive material from Russia to Britain (the actual amount of exported material exceeded by twice the declared amount) by a large Minatom company testified to an unfavorable situation in the *outside circle* of combatting nuclear smuggling, rendering meaningless optimistic statements of *the-smugglers-will-not-pass kind*. Finally, not long before the Summit, Germany got hold of a Russian Federation Federal Security Service document that assumes the plutonium intercepted in Munich was of Russian origin: even Russian officials stopped refuting the possibility of the Obninsk origin of the material.

One should keep an eye on the domestic situation as well. Many in Russia have considered concerns of Western nations, first of all of the United States, regarding the level of physical protection at Russian nuclear facilities to be disguised penetration into the Russian nuclear weapon complex. The presidential aide for national security also does not rule out this danger, "There cannot be purely unselfish goals in international relations. And there is the probability that somebody would like to pursue other additional objectives while resolving security tasks, for example, the reconnaissance-related ones. There have been such cases."²⁵

Having weighed all pros and cons, the Russians chose the right tactics regarding this issue. It was as follows: one should discuss the subject of nuclear diversions despite the fact that it was what the West wanted and Moscow did not: if Russia dodged the issue the guests might think there was something more serious to hide than the already known factors. Thus, Russia admitted that though illicit nuclear trafficking "has not so far become a mass-scale one, the industrially developed countries bear an enormous responsibility for not allowing it to become one of the world worst realities alongside terrorism and drug smuggling." Russia agreed that the G-8 should always see to it that measures are taken to prevent illicit nuclear trafficking and to stop the spread of terrorism into the nuclear realm. In particular, Russia specially singled out the necessity to improve a mechanism for information exchange, for development of cooperation among special services (primarily on a bilateral basis), and for development and adoption of international norms and procedures for suing provocateurs, illicit traders and buyers of nuclear materials.²⁶

The program for preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear material, adopted by the G-8, contains an important statement: "The majority of cases, so far, have involved only small amounts of fissile material or material of little use for weapon's purposes, and many apprehended nuclear traffickers have been swindlers or petty thieves."²⁷ However, all the G-8 countries admitted that "cases of illicit nuclear trafficking continue to occur."²⁸

In order to prevent illicit nuclear trafficking in the future, the G-8 states agreed, in particular, to regularly share and promptly disseminate information on nuclear theft and smuggling incidents: to exchange information regarding significant incidents in this area, especially if sensitive material is involved, and to establish appropriate national points of contact for this purpose; to foster enhanced cooperation and coordination among national intelligence, customs, and law enforcement agencies and cooperation with their counterparts in other concerned countries to ensure prompt investigation and successful prosecution in cases of illicit nuclear trafficking; and to exchange scientific information and data to identify origin, history, and route of intercepted illicit nuclear material. However, no agreement has been reached on creating a nuclear "data bank" and it appears to be a long process.

It is noteworthy that the Programme reflects the common position of all the G-8 states regarding the importance of cooperation in the area of physical protection. Until recently Russia has been very cautious about this issue, and only now it has begun to understand the importance of such cooperation. The first step is the U.S./Russia project at the Mashinostroitelny Zavod [Machine-building plant] enterprise in Elektrostal city.

It is difficult to overestimate the adoption of the joint Programme for preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear material. Though, like the Moscow Declaration, this document is of general character, it contains objectives for prevention of illicit nuclear trafficking and ways to reach them, which were agreed on by all G-8 states. This coordinated and unified position appears to be the main achievement. The Programme shows that not only an individual state, but all states are concerned with this problem. And the entire world community should seek ways to resolve it, not just seek someone to blame (though the main responsibility for preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear material rests with governments of those states where sensitive material is located and it is first of all their concern to provide material protection, control, and accounting).

The adoption of the joint Programme allowed mutual reproaches and suspicions regarding nuclear smuggling to be put an end, as well as to discussion of whether such suspicions were well-founded or not (the answer was yes) and for a constructive dialogue to begin (on a bilateral or multilateral basis) on preventing and combatting nuclear smuggling.

The next steps in this direction will be taken at the G-7 Lyon Summit at the end of June. Russia believes that a Protocol on G-8 special services cooperation to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear material should be signed at the Lyon Summit. The same meeting should also develop the idea of an international Convention on combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear material and preventing nuclear terrorism, decide on creating an international center for fighting nuclear terrorism, and discuss preparations for a meeting of international experts on fissile material.

A Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban

It should be noted that nuclear disarmament-related problems were not on the Summit agenda. However, the G-8 had to overcome a general feeling of a general and unbinding discussion. The only "perceptible" result was the Statement on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, where the G-8 expressed their coordinated position regarding the issue. Of course, there is nothing new for experts. However, the fact that the treaty was signed by all (except China) nuclear states gives special importance to it and makes it easier to proceed at the Geneva conference.

First, the G-8 affirmed their commitment to the Australian variant of the draft treaty, underlining that "the CTBT must prohibit any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. We affirmed that this would constitute a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban."²⁹ Second, the "critical date" was confirmed, by which the Treaty should be agreed on and opened for signature — September 1996. As President Yeltsin said, "we are ready right now, this year, to sign a nuclear test ban in any atmosphere and of any breadth." However, he immediately added an afterthought that the other Summit participants must have thought of. "But there is China, which has to be worked with. (...) in order to persuade it [China] to sign the Treaty for it to become universal and indefinite."³⁰

Yeltsin's visit to China is very symptomatic in this respect. He has fulfilled the instructions of the G-8 and communicated to the Chinese leadership the idea that a CTBT should be adopted jointly, by the "nuclear five," in the Australian formulation (to lift any complaints regarding "peaceful nuclear explosions") and in September. According to President Yeltsin, his calling was welcomed. At the same time there have not been no grounds to be optimistic about China's position regarding the early conclusion of the CTBT and the G-8 statement will hardly become some weighty argument to China.

However, China could follow Russia's steps and adopt before or during its adherence to the CTBT a unilateral statement which would reflect the PRC's position without conflicting with the treaty. In this connection, on the eve of the Nuclear Safety

and Security Summit, an official Statement of the press-secretary of the President of the Russian Federation regarding a CTBT was disseminated. It begins with the reaffirmation that "Russia supports its commitment to a ban on any test explosions of nuclear weapons and any other nuclear explosions in any environment." It further indicates that Russia "has a special responsibility for maintaining safety and security of its nuclear arsenal until a universal and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, which remains our final goal." in this connection "under conditions of the CTBT (...) [it] will have to conduct works on maintaining its nuclear stockpile, which will not contradict the ban under the future treaty."³¹

The following measures are to be undertaken: first, to adopt a Federal program for works on providing security and safety of Russian nuclear stockpiles without conducting nuclear explosions; second, to fund Russian nuclear centers and to implement programs there in the area of theoretical and nuclear technological developments research to maintain scientific and technological capabilities and high qualifications of scientists, designers and workers; third, to preserve a basic potential to resume nuclear tests if the Russian Federation is no longer limited by the Treaty.

Russia claimed that "if its supreme interests are jeopardized, it will use its right to withdraw from the Treaty in order to conduct all necessary tests that could be needed in case there is no other possibility to confirm the high level of certainty in safety or reliability of any of the key types of the Russian nuclear weapons."³²

It appears that this Statement is a well-balanced and well-considered document (including its form — on behalf of the presidential press-secretary of the president). On the one hand, it resists the pressure of those who hope that Russia will resume nuclear tests. On the other hand, it lifts concerns of those who would like to deprive Russia of the possibility to resume nuclear tests in case of a radical change in the international situation. However, there is a long way from the treaty's completion to its entry into force, and China's position is not the only possible obstacle.

The Chernobyl NPP

The presence of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma during the major part of the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit was an important success of Kiev's diplomacy. President Kuchma stated Ukraine's support of the Programme for Preventing and Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material, the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration, and the Statement on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The Summit recognized the importance of L. Kuchma's decision to shut down the Chernobyl NPP by 2000, consistent with the Memorandum of Understanding signed on December 20, 1995.³³ Signatories of the Memorandum of Understanding reaffirmed their commitment to its complete implementation and noted that they will closely cooperate with Ukraine and international banks of development in order to work out measures to assist Ukraine. In particular, there was allotment of a \$3 billion credit to Ukraine for "the Chernobyl NPP's shut-down," out of which \$2.5 billion is to be given as credit and \$500 million — as free assistance.³⁴ On his side, Leonid Kuchma reaffirmed Ukraine's willingness to actively and effectively cooperate within the framework of the Memorandum; he once again confirmed that the Chernobyl NPP will be closed by 2000, and announced that one of its blocks is likely to be phased out in the near future.³⁵

At the Summit, Leonid Kuchma and Boris Yeltsin expressed their concern regarding the state of the sarcophagus which was allegedly designed as an interim construction and will last a maximum of 10 years.³⁶ In this connection the G-8 discussed the process of the on-going research regarding the sarcophagus (financed by the European Union) and expressed their wish, on Leonid Kuchma's insistence (who made the G-8 introduce changes into the Statement on Ukraine at the last moment),³⁷ that this research be completed before the end of the year so that a final decision could be made on how to resolve the problem of burial of the fourth energy unit.

However, there was an impression that Leonid Kuchma was not completely satisfied with the Summit's results. According to his words, the G-7 and Ukraine should sign an agreement which would set forth terms, dates and sources of funding of all measures stipulated for by the program of closure of the Chernobyl

NPP. Without such agreements "Ukraine will not be able to undertake the responsibility to phase out the Chernobyl NPP meeting all nuclear safety requirements."³⁸

It was fundamentally important to Russia that the problem of the Chernobyl NPP and the problem of RBMK reactors would be separately discussed at the Summit. And that is what happened: nobody from the G-7 wanted to tease Minatom. Thus, the demands to immediately shut down all Russian RBMK reactors were not on the Summit agenda. At the same time Russian officials informally hinted that Ukraine was making a mistake, promising to close the Chernobyl NPP by 2000.

As an argument, they cited conclusions of an international expert group regarding RBMK reactors, according to which problems of NPPs with RBMK are not specific. As for Western NPPs with the same service life, these problems are associated with modernization of old generating units to meet ever stringent safety requirements or introducing compensating measures. According to a number of Russian scientists, since the Chernobyl accident in 1986, a number of developments has been introduced at all RBMK units.³⁹ According to the international projects, no unsolved safety problem was found for the third-generation reactors: second-generation units can be upgraded to safety standards of third-generation units; first-generation units cause greater concern, but even they are amenable to improve safety measures through modernization.

Thus, the conclusion is drawn, "there are no technical reasons for closing down the nuclear stations before they complete their design service period; the discovered defects of RBMK reactors are similar to the defects of Western reactors built according to old standards, and none of the defects is technically irremediable. (...) The Chernobyl station had not been included among the stations dealt with in the projects, but it is apparent that the Western conclusions can be applied to its units as well."⁴⁰

Moscow believes that, speaking about closing down the Chernobyl NPP, which makes a minor contribution to power generation (6% of the overall power generation), Ukraine is more concerned with social aspects and Western aid. "Considering that the early closure of the Chernobyl units has no scientific and technological substantiation, and may result in Ukraine losing several tens of billions of dollars, all responsibility for damage compensation should be shared between parties to this purely political decision."⁴¹

Non-Deployment of Nuclear Weapons Outside National Territories

At any Summit every delegation always has a card which it by all means wants to play and lays on it special hopes: sometimes the whole thing is started by only this very card. The initiative not to deploy nuclear weapons outside national territories of their owners was such a card for Russia at the Moscow Summit.⁴² This idea has been in the air for a long time and it is important that it was Russia that voiced it at the right time — at the time when all G-8 leaders were together (though this issue, as well as the CTBT issue, was not formally included into the Summit agenda).

Unlike the previous important Russian initiative (the fall of 1994) regarding conclusion of a Treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability, this one is not so encompassing. It is extremely concrete, very simple and quite attractive to the majority of the countries. Unfortunately, the initiative was in the background of discussion, as often occurs with Russian initiatives regarding arms control. Despite the Kremlin's desperate attempts to promote it through the press before the Summit, the initiative was discussed neither as a primary, nor as a secondary issue.

The NPT does not insist that nuclear weapons be located only on national territories. At the same time the experience of the "nuclear age" shows that the worst international grievances occurred when nuclear weapons were deployed outside national territories (e.g., by the Soviet Union in Cuba or in Poland, in Hungary and in Czechia; by the United States in Turkey and then in Italy, in Belgium, and in Germany, etc.).

Though deployment of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states outside their territories does not violate the letter of the NPT; it certainly conflicts with its spirit. Indeed, one cannot speak of a non-nuclear status of states which have nuclear arsenals, even those which they have no control of, on their territories. It is no mere chance that many states go further and, on concluding treaties

on nuclear-weapon-free zones; specially stipulating not only non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, but also non-deployment on territories of zonal states and even for their non-transit.

"The 1992-1994 Ukrainian precedent" has illustrated that a state on whose territory another state's nuclear weapons lie might want to seek rights to these weapons. According to data of the international organization *Greenpeace*, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, in particular, which were deployed on bases in Germany, Belgium and Greece, belong not only to the United States, but to the listed states as well since pilots of these states gain access to the weapons during training flights and, supposedly, will gain access to them in case of a military conflict.⁴³

At present nuclear weapons of the two states - the United States and Britain - are also located outside their national territories. It is first of all 500 B61 nuclear aviation bombs on aviation bases in Germany, Belgium, Britain, Italy, Greece and Turkey. In addition, more than fifty British WE-117 nuclear tactical aviation bombs for Tornado fighter-bombers are deployed on bases in Germany.

In order to reduce proliferation risks, it would be very important to withdraw these weapons from the territories of Western European states, where they are currently located.

One cannot expect automatic support of the Russian initiative by the United States and Britain. It is no mere chance that a Pentagon's top official, in his interview to the *Segodnya* newspaper, stated the day before the Summit that these aviation bombs "do not have military importance and are not targeted against anybody. They have a stabilizing influence on the situation in Europe since they are a means of nuclear deterrence that nuclear-weapon states - members of NATO can use." The West does not plan to relocate or deploy more nuclear weapons in Europe in case of NATO's enlargement since "there is no need to conduct additional negotiations with Russia on this issue."⁴⁴

At the same time it is high time this question were brought up for an active discussion at various levels. It is noteworthy that a number of G-8 states were very responsive to this new initiative of Moscow. Thus, Canada's Ambassador in Moscow Jeremy Kinsman called it "realistic and reasonable." According to his words, "it is unlikely that any nuclear-weapon state has plans to expand the zone of its deployment."⁴⁵

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in Europe

All the same, the main agenda of the Russian delegation was to uncover the true stance of the Western partners, first of all the United States and Germany, towards creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe. Only a year ago, at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, Russia was skeptical about this scenario, today the situation is fundamentally different (it is regrettable that Russian diplomats did not foresee it then). NATO's enlargement to the East, with Poland, Hungary, Czechia and Slovakia's entry, will become inevitable in the spring of 1997 and Russia will have to tolerate it. Deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and on the warships of the Baltic fleet (in spite of the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol) is more likely to be bravado, which is backed up with neither military, nor diplomatic calculations, rather than a reasonable way out.⁴⁶ Hence, Russia needs space for a diplomatic maneuver to forestall the possible deployment of nuclear weapons in the new states parties to NATO.

Of course, a Treaty on non-deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territories adopted by the "nuclear five" would rule out this risk. It is also understandable that it will take long to develop such a document once it started. While the issue of the creation of a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone could be resolved very quickly, especially given two factors: first, there is considerable experiences in creating regional nuclear-weapon-free zones (only recently two new zones - in Africa and in the South-East Asia - have been created), including legal aspects; second, there is Belarus's initiative,⁴⁷ which aroused the interest of Ukraine, Sweden and Austria; in addition, such authoritative international non-governmental organizations as the *Pugwash* movement and *Physicians for Prevention of a Nuclear War* insist that such a zone be created.⁴⁸

It is no mere chance that during the Summit there was a series of

official and unofficial statements regarding the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe. Thus, Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, Igor Ivanov, in his interview to *Yaderny Kontrol*, said that "Russia's position of principle is to create as many nuclear-weapon-free zones as possible (and) Russia would only welcome the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe."⁴⁹ Sergei Kislyak, Director of Russia's Foreign Ministry's department for security and disarmament, added, "especially given the possible enlargement of NATO into the East, this idea is becoming more and more acute and it has been increasingly discussed among specialists."⁵⁰ The Press-Secretary of the President of the Russian Federation, Sergei Medvedev, affirmed that Russia's official policy is creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones everywhere where there are currently no nuclear weapons: "in Eastern Europe, including the outlying districts, a de-facto nuclear-weapon-free zone has emerged. Russia believes that if this nuclear-weapon-free zone were not legally finalized now, it would be "a missed chance."⁵¹

It is understandable that neither the United States, nor Eastern-European states welcome the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, if Russia and the United States reach mutual understanding regarding this issue, it will be difficult for Poland, Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia to refuse this idea. Their refusal would mean that they are seriously considering the possibilities of deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories. In addition, in case of the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, these states would receive special security assurances.

Today it is too early to speak of borders of the European zone (or zones). Russia and the United States would probably prefer that it is not only Belarus (and moreover, not Russia), but some Central European countries that put up this initiative. In addition, Sweden's official proposal to start a discussion on creating a nuclear-weapon-free Baltic-Black Sea corridor appears only logical.⁵² Beginning in April 1996, Russia, too, has been proposing, at official and unofficial levels, to include the issue of a European nuclear-weapon-free zone into agendas of large international forums. I think that neither the United States nor NATO have weighty premises to turn down this initiative.

At the Summit the issue of creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe was not even addressed, although "various ways" were being studied to avoid confrontation during NATO's enlargement.⁵³ It was noted at the meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Helmut Kohl that "the coming months should be used to find solutions with due consideration to the interests of Russia and of those states that are seeking membership in the Alliance."⁵⁴ At the same time Chancellor Helmut Kohl, leader of the state whose eastern part is "a nuclear-weapon-free zone" under the Treaty 2+4, was skeptical about prospects of creating such a zone in Europe, adding that "its time has not yet come."

- ***

The results of the Moscow Safety and Security Summit are not so sparse as they might at first appear. The documents adopted on the Summit results, as well as the statements made during the Summit, raise a number of key problems, set objectives before the G-8 governments, and indicate ways of solving them. The major result of the meeting is that Russia has returned to the political scene as a great power which is no longer kept waiting outside in the corridor during discussions and is no longer "reprimanded" for its "mistakes" and that the P-8 dialogue on nuclear safety was conducted on an equal basis, with no division into "elders" and "youngers." Russia demonstrated its capability to put forward responsible and considerate initiatives.

Of course, the *Club of 7* has just begun to turn into the *Club of 8*, and Russia's low economic performance will be the major obstacle on this way; so far there has also been unwillingness on the part of the United States, Canada and Japan to create a permanent G-8. However, this process has had a dignified beginning.

¹ Press-Conference of Russia's President Boris Yeltsin and France's President Jacques Chirac on results of the G-8 Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Moscow, April 20 1996. - Federal News Service. April 20, 1996, 16:00.

² Ibid.

³ See Bulletin of USEA News, June 21, 1995.

⁴ Izvestia, April 18, 1996, p. 5.

⁵ Izvestia, April 19, 1996, p. 3.

⁶ Segodnya, April 19, 1996, p. 1.

⁷ Press-Conference of Yuri Baturin, Presidential Aide for National Security. Moscow, April 18, 1996. - Federal News Service. April 18, 1996, 18:00.

⁸ Press-Conference of Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Jacques Chirac.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ The Moscow Times, April 4, 1996.

¹¹ As a result of the discussions, a "background document on nuclear safety and security" was disseminated, which included agreed positions of the Summit's participants regarding nuclear material accounting and control, safety of civilian nuclear reactors, nuclear waste management, safe and effective management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes.

¹² Speech of Russia's President Boris Yeltsin at the Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, Moscow, April 20, 1996, p. 2.

¹³ The Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration, Moscow, April 20, 1996, p. 1.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Speech of Russia's President Boris Yeltsin at the Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, Moscow, April 20, 1996, p. 15.

¹⁶ See *Andreyeva Guba: Another Nuclear Theft Has Been Detected (Investigation Report by Mikhail Kulik)*, Yaderny Kontrol Digest #1 pp.17-21

¹⁷ NPT, CONF/1995/L.8, p. 2.

¹⁸ Press-Conference of Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov and Director of Security and Disarmament Department of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation in the press center of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation on April 18 1996. - Federal News Service, April 18, 1996, 14:30.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ The Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration, Moscow, April 20, 1996, p. 3.

²¹ Speech of Russia's President Boris Yeltsin at the Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, Moscow, April 20, 1996, p. 8.

²² The Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration, Moscow, April 20, 1996, p. 2.

²³ Speech of Russia's President Boris Yeltsin at the Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, Moscow, April 20, 1996, p. 13.

²⁴ The Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration, Moscow, April 20, 1996, p. 2.

²⁵ Press-Conference of Yuri Baturin, Presidential Aide for National Security. Moscow, April 18, 1996.

²⁶ Speech of Russia's President Boris Yeltsin at the Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, Moscow, April 20, 1996, p. 11.

²⁷ Programme for preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear material, Moscow, April 20, 1996, p. 1.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Statement on Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, The Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, Moscow, April 20, 1996, p. 1.

³⁰ Press-Conference of Russia's President Boris Yeltsin and France's President Jacques Chirac on results of the G-8 Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Moscow, April 20 1996. - Federal News Service, April 20, 1996.

³¹ The Statement of the Press-Secretary of the President of the Russian Federation regarding a CTBT.

³² Ibid.

³³ The Statement on Ukraine, The Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, Moscow, April 20, 1996, p. 1.

³⁴ Press-Conference of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and French President Jacques Chirac on results of the G-8 Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Moscow, April, 20 1996. - Federal News Service, April 20, 1996.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ According to environmentalist Alexei Yablokov, it is five years or even less, Interfax, April 11, 1996.

³⁷ Interview of Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine Konstantin Grishchenko to Interfax-Ukraine, April 20, 1996.

³⁸ Interfax, April 20, 1996.

³⁹ The new features include: the reduced positive steam coefficient, new-design control rods, quick-acting emergency protection devices, on-tap reserves of reactivity, closer metal monitoring, changes in the operating regulations, no unauthorized cut-out of emergency protection, etc.

⁴⁰ Concerning the Chernobyl nuclear power station (Findings and Conclusions of International Expert Groups), Reference material for the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, April 19-20, 1996, pp. 11-13.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² "Russia has undertaken most vigorous measures to concentrate promptly in its territory all nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union. The year 1996 will witness the final stage of this work: the withdrawal of nuclear arsenals from Byelorussia and Ukraine and their dismantling. I believe, it is in our mutual interest to make sure that nuclear weapons of all nuclear states are concentrated solely within the boundaries of their own territories." Speech of Russia's President Boris Yeltsin at the Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, Moscow, April 20, 1996, p. 13.

⁴³ Interview of Vladimir Orlov with Joshua Handler, April 1995, New York.

⁴⁴ Segodnya, April 19, 1996, p. 1.

⁴⁵ Interfax, April, 19, 1996.

⁴⁶ It is no mere chance that Presidential Press-Secretary

Sergei Medvedev at the press-conference on April 19, 1996, undubiously indicated that Russia is not considering re-deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus or deployments in Kaliningrad Region or on warships of the Baltic fleet. The Presidential Press-Secretary underlined that such actions would conflict with Moscow's present policy.

⁴⁷ At the NPT Review and Extension Conference, Belarus' Foreign Minister Uladimir Syanko noted the importance of the existing and emerging nuclear-weapon free zones and recalled that "Belarus mentioned a possibility to create this kind of zones in the center of Europe as far back as in 1990. Today, with Ukraine's recent decision on being non-nuclear, one could speak of specific grounds for the implementation of this idea. We are somewhat concerned, however, about possible risks of more and more places in Europe being used for nuclear weapons deployment in case of NATO's geographical expansion."

⁴⁸ One of the movement's leaders, Dr. Ron McCou from Malaysia, made an appropriate statement at its press-conference in Moscow (see Interfax, April, 16 1996).

⁴⁹ Press-Conference in the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, April 18, 1996.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Press-Conference of Presidential Press-Secretary Sergei Medvedev on April 19, 1996. Cited on Interfax, April, 19, 1996.

⁵² See Yan Prawitz, A Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea.

A report was submitted to the Pugwash Workshop that took place in Moscow in March, 1996.

⁵³ In this respect a document adopted on April 19, 1996, at the Yeltsin-Chirac bilateral meeting regarding a new European security system. The document admits that "one cannot take into consideration only military aspects while solving problems of European security." "We have come to a joint understanding that the OSCE should be a basis of a European Security Architecture, which includes three main constituents: the European Union and its defence link - the Western European Union, the North-Atlantic Organization, and Russia as an essential part of European security architecture. We believe that strengthening the OSCE and development of cooperation of the three main constituents will play a specially important role in Europe's security and stability." - A Joint Statement of Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Jacques Chirac on European Security Architecture, Moscow, April 19, 1996.

⁵⁴ Interfax, April 19 1996.