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Proliferation Challenges and Nonproliferation Opportunities for New Administrations

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Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group

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The Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) is the largest non-governmental organization in the United States devoted exclusively to research and training on nonproliferation issues. Dr. William C. Potter is the director of CNS, which has a staff of more than 50 full-time personnel and 65 student research assistants, with offices in Monterey, CA; Washington, DC; and Almaty, Kazakhstan. The mission of CNS is to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and disseminating timely information and analysis.

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FOREWORD

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The Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group convened in July 1999 in response to mounting dangers of nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile proliferation. Although this past year was a marked improvement on 1998—the *annus horribilus* of escalating proliferation threats—the seriousness, tenacity, and sheer number of challenges to the nonproliferation regimes continue to put the international nonproliferation architecture at risk.

In a time of increasing economic interdependence but diminishing confidence in multilateral security institutions, we need *strategic* vision to guide efforts to enhance international security. Toward that end, the seasoned policymakers and distinguished analysts who comprise the Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group are engaged in strategic reflection on how best to marshal international resources to address proliferation threats. A summary of the Strategy Group's activities and associated publications are available online at <http://cns.muis.edu/research/mnsg/index.htm>.

This publication presents discussion papers prepared for the Strategy Group's July 12-14, 2000 meeting, held in Monterey, California. They offer a wide-ranging set of informed and sometimes provocative contributions to the vital tasks of assessing emerging threats, rethinking fundamental assumptions, and outlining innovative but practical policy measures to combat proliferation and buttress international nonproliferation norms and institutions.

This meeting and other activities of the Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group have been made possible in part through the generous support of The Ford Foundation, Jill and Jeff Harris, The John Merck Fund, and the W. Alton Jones Foundation.

RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

by Vladimir Orlov

PIR Center

RUSSIA AND THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

On May 20, 2000, the NPT Review Conference successfully adopted, by consensus, a Final Document that contained both a backward-looking review of how the treaty was operating, and a forward-looking perspective of what could and should be done to further strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and promote nuclear disarmament. Thus the conference was able to adopt a final document for the first time in 15 years.

The success of the conference became possible, in decisive measure, due to the well-coordinated position of the five declared nuclear weapon states (N-5), which acted jointly and compromised to finally reach a balanced document. The success of the conference—and, with it, of the whole international nonproliferation regime—would not have become a reality if the N-5 had failed to sign a joint statement prior to the Final Document. On the eve of the conference, one of the key issues for experts was the position of nuclear weapon states: would they unite and forget serious differences in US-Russian and US-Chinese relations, particularly those caused by the US intention to deploy the national missile defense system?

Several days before the conference, many experts argued that the ABM/NMD debate might make Russian governmental experts consider whether Russia should join the N-5 alliance, or take its own position, following China's example. China's special position on a number of issues— from ABM/NMD to FMCT— called into question the viability of such a coalition, and could have transformed the N-5 into the N-4. Moreover, many NPT parties would have found this position beneficial. It is evident that not only China but even a number of NATO states share concerns expressed in the Russian policy on missile defense matters.

Naturally, the temptation to uphold the moral high ground when attending the NPT Review Conference and thus to become estranged from the United States was nearly irresistible, but Russian diplomats wisely demonstrated self-control and defied this temptation. If they had refused to participate in concerted N-5 efforts, it would have been a tactical gain but a strategic loss, since the entire essence of the NPT would have been undermined. This, in turn, would eventually run counter to long-term Russian interests.

It is important that Moscow decided in the end not to undermine the regime. No less important, Beijing made a similar decision on the eve of the conference. As a result, the N-5 made a united front at the conference, which was a real surprise for some experts and delegations.

Russia attended the conference with several trump cards in hand, such as its ratification of START II and the CTBT (which will not mean the treaties' entry into force, although for different reasons). From the first day of the conference, Russia's position was flexible and active. Although the speech of the Russian minister was a clear statement of Russia's position on ABM/NMD and a demonstration of its firmness, Moscow took no diplomatic efforts to continue the offensive during the conference, since such an attack was not planned. During the conference, the N-5 preferred solidarity to public clashes.

The agreed statement of the N-5 delegations presented to the conference on May 1 made an important positive contribution. The statement, *inter alia*, welcomed ratification of the CTBT by the Russian Federation and declared that "none of our nuclear weapons are targeted at any state." It also said:

ratification of START II by the Russian Federation is an important step in the efforts to reduce strategic offensive weapons and is welcome. Completion

of ratification of START II by the United States remains a priority. We look forward to the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

Russia's decision at the NPT Review Conference to promote the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, rather than its own views and feelings on NMD, was a wise one. It demonstrated, in practice, Russia's real commitment to nuclear nonproliferation.

RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN NONPROLIFERATION

Russia has a core interest in preserving and strengthening the NPT and the nuclear nonproliferation regime. According to the Concept of National Security approved in January 2000, the need to strengthen nonproliferation of WMD and their delivery systems is "the primary task in the area of maintaining national security," while WMD proliferation is considered one of the major threats to national security and to Russia's interests.

As President Putin stated:

Russia demonstrates its firm commitment to strengthen export controls and the WMD nonproliferation regime. [...] Russia is committed to its obligations in the area of nuclear disarmament, intends to follow them in the conditions of strategic stability and within the framework of the disarmament agreements signed in the recent decades as a basis for further strategic offensive arms reduction and limitation.

This statement should be followed strictly, and introduced into practical, political, and diplomatic measures.

According to the all-Russian public opinion poll conducted in 2000 at the request of the PIR Center, Moscow, and in cooperation with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 78 percent of Russians (presumably, emotionally

and not as experts) support continued nuclear nonproliferation endeavors.

Even throughout the most terrible economic difficulties, Russia has never directly or indirectly violated Article I of the NPT, and has not transferred nuclear weapons or their components to other states. Russia also has complied with Article IV concerning assistance to non-nuclear weapon states by providing peaceful technologies. Its construction of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, Iran should be considered in this context.

Like the United States, Russia also had proliferation temptations. But unlike the US temptations—the desire to play the role of the only superpower (sometimes without knowing when to stop and breaching international norms)—Russian temptation was weak and related to loss of great power status. To date, Russia has mainly managed to resist this temptation. Having in general a positive nonproliferation record, Russia, however, has faced serious problems, such as:

- inadequate physical protection, accounting and control of weapons-grade nuclear material ("first line of defense") and a weak customs service ("second line of defense"), which in some cases has led to loss, leakage, or smuggling of proliferation-sensitive material;
- inefficient export controls— as a result of which Russian proliferation-sensitive components, primarily missile components, were smuggled to Iraq and Iran;
- lack of a nonproliferation culture and of a new generation of personnel to reduce proliferation risks; and
- lack of coordination among different governmental agencies.

Export controls are still one of the most urgent problems on the agenda. According to a senior official of the Russian Foreign Intelligence (SVR):

The experience of world developed economies shows that essential for efficient functioning of an export control system is a high level of voluntary law-abidance of exporters. Russian exporters have another motivation—they are

more interested in getting maximum profit in the shortest possible period of time without due understanding of consequences that may result from illegal commercial activities. It's astonishing! What's more, if we don't solve this problem in the near future we'll have to deal with the most surprising violations. Very often they are deliberate, and delicate methods are used to conceal criminal activity.

PRIORITIES AND POLICIES

The number one priority for the Russian president in the nonproliferation area should be establishing a state nonproliferation policy. Currently, there are many statements by numerous officials, but no *state policy* in this area. Minatom policy or Federal Security Bureau (FSB) policy is still just the policy of an agency. Russia badly needs such a state policy, otherwise, interested ministries and agencies will prevail over correctly declared goals. This state policy must put an end to attempts by certain ministries to pursue their own interests.

The next step should be establishing an appropriate inter-agency body or presidential authority (a Russian Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agency).

Some practical steps could be taken on unilateral (Russia), bilateral (Russia-United States), and multilateral levels to meet the principals and objectives of nonproliferation and arms control declared at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and developed in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference.

Proposed Unilateral Steps

- As a demonstration of its strong commitment to the spirit of the NPT, Russia should declare that no more proliferation-sensitive supplies will be sent to states that are not parties to the NPT or that are not in full compliance with the NPT, and that existing contracts with such states will be frozen.
- In its 2001 budget, Russia should invest more in improvement of the first and second lines of defense to prevent any leakage

of weapons-grade nuclear material. It should invest more in improving the security of storage areas, and of transportation of remaining nuclear warheads and chemical weapons.

- Russia should demonstrate more transparency in BW elimination and implementation of the BWC.
- Russia should establish a program of education and training to introduce nonproliferation culture to key facilities, enterprises, research institutes, and universities.

Proposed Bilateral Steps

- Russia and the United States should finally resume a good Cold War tradition and establish a senior permanent bilateral group on nonproliferation, mainly to assess emerging proliferation threats in the world. Russia should be interested in maintaining a productive and continuous dialogue with the United States on key nonproliferation issues, which would replace the petty quarrels of recent years.
- As part of the arms control agenda, the parties should commence official START III talks as soon as possible, which can be concluded with a treaty signed by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Bill Clinton in 2000 (taking into account existing progress and agreements reached within the framework of bilateral consultations). START III will envisage the reduction of strategic offensive arms to 1,500 warheads for each state, with the subsequent elimination of nuclear warheads under a mutually acceptable transparency provision to prevent the possibility of re-use. START III should provide for the possibility of mounting MIRVs on existing (those that remain under START II) stationary or mobile missiles (but no more than three re-entry vehicles on each missile).
- The ABM Treaty should remain effective and preserve the current ban on deploying ABM systems for the defense of territory and providing a base for such a defense. At the same time, the parties may agree to designate two areas of limited missile defense deployment with the same number of in-

terceptor missiles, as provided in the original text of the treaty. Hence, amendments would deal with ABM deployment sites, which may be chosen by the parties but not necessarily in or near the capitals or in the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launcher's silo deployment sites, as provided for by the treaty. This could be achieved by making amendments to the ABM Treaty Protocol of 1974, which reduced the number of sites from two to one.

- Russia and the United States should sum up publicly the provisional results of their 1991-1992 unilateral initiatives on tactical nuclear weapons and make further unilateral statements confirming their prior commitments. They should also probably form some implementation schedule, which could be legally binding for the parties.
- Russia and the United States should intensify efforts to implement the 1996 Trilateral Initiative (United States-Russia-IAEA) to verify weapons-usable fissile material.
- The United States should significantly increase the amount of assistance to Russia within the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) framework (US Department of Defense) and the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Program (US Department of Energy). The programs should become more socially oriented. The United States should appropriate long-awaited substantial funding for CW dismantlement in Russia.

Proposed Multilateral Steps

- All nuclear weapon states should make unilateral declarations on non-deployment of nuclear weapons outside their national territory, in accordance with the spirit of the NPT. US tactical nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from Europe and Turkey.
- It is necessary to remove obstacles for FMCT negotiations in Geneva. The nuclear weapon states should take a flexible position on setting up a corresponding committee at the conference, if non-nuclear weapon states insist on parallel establishment of other subsidiary bodies, e.g., on

nuclear disarmament issues. It would be reasonable to take into account the position of China and some other states on creating a subsidiary body on preventing an arms race in outer space (PAROS).

Obviously, implementation of the aforementioned measures does not depend on Russia alone, and some of these steps do not depend on Russia at all. However, at this time it is important that Russia put forward a complex nonproliferation initiative. The favorable situation, starting to emerge in the State Duma after its smooth ratification of START II and the CTBT, would make this initiative even more convincing.